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Markets and Intermediaries: An Enquiry
about the Principles of "NIarket Economy
in the Grain Market of Delhi
DENIS VIDAL
If it is so, then the interaction of anthropology and economics may come for
once to be more than an exchange of exotic facts for parochial concepts and
develop into a reciprocally seditious endeavour useful to both.
CLIFFORD GEF.RTZ
Situated at the western edge of the Walled City, Naya Bazaar offers an
impressive sight. Here, concentrated in a very small section of the old city, is
not only the heart of the grain market ofDe1hi, but one of the most important
grain markets for the whole of Harth India. According ta market people,
only 20 per cent of the grain which is negotiated here would be consumed
in Delhi itself. It is also the main centre for grain export outside India. Naya
Bazaar must be one of the most congested areas of Delhi bath during the
day and at night. With the exception ofSundays and a few moments ofrelative
quietude at dawn and dusk, there is no respite in this place which functions
not only as a commercial centre but also as home ta hundreds of coolies
who work here during the day.' The traders themselves, who once used to
live above their shops, have slowly moved away to quieter places of residence
outside the walled city.
Along the main road and in a few adjacent streets, one finds during the
day a constant flux ofcoolies, dalals (intermediaries), employees and traders,
jostling together in the most indescribable chaos, made worse by the
astonishing variety of vehicles. But, what really gives the place its identity
and dominates the urban landscape is the mass of large jute bags full of
grain, which seem to fill every possible vacant space in the area. However,
the perpetuaI train ofvehicles, advancing slowly in the desperate attempt ta
load or unload their sacks of grain in shops where bags never seem to cease
accumulating is a rather deceptive sight: the bags which arrive at Naya Bazaar
constitute only a fragment of the grain trade. This is just the semi-wholesale
market oriented towards the relatively small clientele of individual
shopkeepers in Delhi and its neighbourhood. The main part of the trade
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(the wholesale trade) is less visible; it is negotiated mostly in the hundreds
of small offices which occupy each floor of the rather dilapidated buildings
in the area. And apart from the omnipresence of telephones, account books
and computers which are becoming increasingly common, the only apparent
manifestation of the innumerable transactions which represent hundreds
and thousands of tons of cereals per day is the sight of a few grams of grain
in small plastic bags which circulate from hand to hand between traders and
intermediaries throughout the entire market.
IN SEARCH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
MARKET ECONOMYIN INDIA
Historians of economic thought have remarked on the paradoxical
circumstances which gave birth ta the development of economic theory in
England. On the one hand, it was a time when people seemed painfully
conscious of the diminishing importance of local fairs and markets where
buyers and sellers negotiated the price ofagricultural goods directly between
themselves. According to economic historians, this happened because of
the extension ofregional trade in the grain market which led to the increasing
influence ofbig traders and trading intermediaries. 2 But in spite of this-or
more plausibly because of Ït-this was also the time when the concept of the
market as we know it today was developed. In this standard conception of
the market, the active involvement of intermediaries in the functioning
of every stage of the market process tends to be either ignored or
underestimated. Furthermore, it is taken for granted that any interaction
which does not favour the direct encounter between buyers and sellers can
only constitute an impediment to the functioning of the market. An
anthropological approach to markets can, however, offer a very different
perspective. It obliges us to recognize that the aetivity of market in ter-
mediaries is at the very centre of market mechanisms. As the ethnography
of the grain market at Naya Bazaar illustrates, it is not that intermediaries
block the market process but rather that they create it.
More generally, there is a strange disjunction between the approaches
used for analysing the market and those used for analysing other economic
institutions. While it has been taken [or granted that the best way ofexplaining
market institutions is to uncover the logic and rationality which under/ie
them, it seems obvious to many that such an approach would not be very
helpful if applied to other institutions. The main reason for this discrepancy
is that the market economy tends to be regarded as the only form ofeconomic
organization whose principles of function!ng are not determined by cul tural
values and social principles but rather by an independent logic of its
own. This methodological bias has been aptly analysed by the sociologist,
Mark Granovetter, in a well-known article concerning 'the problem of
embeddedness'.3 He highlights the contrast between two equally un-
satisfactory tendencies in the study of economic institutions in the social
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sciences: on the one hand, the tendency of economists to adopt an
'undersocialized' conception of human action, especially when they study
market institutions; on the other hand, the tendency of sociologists and
social an th ropologists to adopt an 'oversocialized' perspec tive whenever they
study any form of economic activity which cannot immediately be identified
as a market process.
There is little doubt that the study of economic institutions in India has
greatly suffered from this double bias. There has been a tendency to consider
market institutions as alien to the fundamental characteristics of Indian
culture and society and as essentially an import from the West. As a result,
the economic history and sociology of India has for a long time been
particularly distorted: not only have the importance of market institutions
and market processes been underestimated in Indian sociology and history,
there has also been a contrary tendency to exaggerate the importance of
other forms of economic logic (like the so-called jajrnani system) in Indian
society. It is only in recent years that economic historians and social
anthropologists have begun trying to revise such a perspective.4
While it no longer makes sense to deny the importance of market
institutions in the history or sociology of India by attributing them ta
influences of only relatively recent origins, this change of perspective has
potential consequences which have not yet been fully realized. One might
be to shift the nature of the debate, which has long been at the centre of
economic sociology and political discourse in India. We need to get beyond
the endless discussion of the degree to which Western principles of political
economy and economic theories should or should not be applied to societies
like India-a debate, which takes us from Max Weber to Polanyi and others.
There are other questions which are surely much more central to our
understanding of economic processes. In particular, we might consider how
research done in the Indian context might enable us to challenge the use
and legitimacy of economic theories, which may be inappropriate not only
in the Indian context but also more generally in other social and cultural
settings. In other words, the real challenge today is not simply to avoid the
two traps of cultural rclativism and pseudo-universalism; rather, it is to
consider fully the epistemological consequences of those analyses which
contradict the dominant models of economic and sociological thought
whether in India or in other par~s of the world, rather than simply reducing
them to the status of local oddities. It is this direction that 1 have tried to
follow in my own analysis, based on an empirical investigation of the
functioning of the grain market in the bazaars of Old Delhi.
Bazaars and Markets
One of the most interesting attempts to contrast the market with another
form of economic institution was made in the 1960s by Clifford Geertz in
his well-known article about the economic logic of the bazaar in Morocco. 5
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The merit of Geertz' analysis was his avoidance of the trap of assuming that
one should give a central role to social and cultural factors in explaining
bazaar transactions on the one hand, but discarding them automatically while
describing market principles on the other. The core ofGeertz' demonstration
may be briefly summarized as follows: what distinguishes the bazaar from
the market is not local traditions as such but rather the way in which economic
actors get access to relevant information in both cases: the sort ofinteraction
which prevails in the bazaar
is an expression of the fact that such a market rewards a clinical form of search (one
which focuses on the diverging interest of concrete economic actors) more that it
does a survryform (one which focuses on the general interplay offunctional1y defined
economic categories). Search is primarily intensive because the sort of information
one needs cannot be acquired by asking a handful of index questions of a large
number of people, but only by asking a large number of diagnostic questions of a
handful of people. It is this kind of questioning, exploring nuances rather than
canvassing populations, that bazaar bargaining represents.
Geertz concludes his article by explaining that 'here as elsewhere in the
bazaar, everything rests finally on a personal confrontation between intimate
antagonists'. Geertz also rightly notices that clientelized transactions do not
necessarily exclude a more extensive form of survey in the bazaar. Rather,
such surveys constitute preambles to the real transactions to be made among
a 'firmly clientelized buyer and seller exploring the dimensions ofa particular,
likely to be consummated transaction'.6
Neither a Market nor a Bazaar
At first sight it would appear that Geertz' analysis is relevant to most bazaars
and markets of India. It certainly appears appropriate for analysing the
general behaviour ofbuyers and sellers in the different markets ofüld Delhi.
However, there are certain reservations. The type of behaviour Geertz
describes and on which he bases his analysis applies only to retail transactions.
It is only in this case that one can draw an effective contrast between
'extensive' and 'intensive' forms of search for economic information; or
that one can oppose anonymous styles of market interactions with more
personalized ones between buyers and sellers.
However, an analyses of the sort of commercial transactions which take
place between buyers and sellers at the wholesale level in Indian markets
and bazaars, changes not only the style but also the whole process and inner
logic of the transactions. Not only can one no longer contrast different sorts
ofeconomic transaction on the basis of the knowledge that buyers and sellers
individually possess, but more fundamentally, one can no longer consider
the confrontation between buyers and sellers as a central element of the
market institution. Rather, as 1 shaH demonstrate, it is the presence of
intermediaries and the different functions they assume that defines the
characteristics of the market. In exploring the reasons why market
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intermediaries play such a fundamental role, my aim is not simply to highlight
the specificities ofwholesale markets as such, but rather to go beyond this to
reconsider our understanding of the market economy as a whole.
THE GRAIN MARKET IN DELHI
Naya Bazaar, in spite of its importance, constitutes only one of the elements
of the grain market in the capital. Due to historical circumstances in the
commercial development of the city, it is, for example, in the smaller market
of Rui Mandi near-by that the wholesale market for cereal is concentrated.
One will also find in adjacent areas separate grain markets of lesser
importance, selling on a retail basis the produce which they have just
purchased in Naya Bazaar. Similarly, ail around the market, one finds areas
where different sorts of trades and services, which cater to the specific needs
of grain traders are concentrated. There are, for example, street corners
which specialize in recycling jute bags or in making and renting the thetas
(trolleys) which coolies use for transporting grain.
As long as trains were the main means of u-ahsporting grain, the centrality
of the old city remained a relative asset for stocking grain in spite of the
congestion. However, this is no longer the case. Almost ail traders nowadays
prefer to use trucks which, though slightly more expensive, are both faster
and more reliable. It is only in the case of big traders negotiating entire
shipments of grain, generally for export, that transportation by trains is
still preferred. As a result, it has become both advantageous and cheaper
ta have godowns outside the old city. Godowns are now disseminated
throughout the periphery and in the immediate vicinity ofDelhi. A significant
number of them are concentrated in the northern part of the capital known
as Lawrence Road. There, besides the hundreds of godowns which give a
strange deserted look ta the area, are numerous small factories where sorne
of the grain which transits thmugh Delhi is also processed before being
resold and sent again outside the city. While the majority of traders,
commercial intermediaries and accountants are stilllocated at Naya Bazaar,
it is at Lawrence Road that one finds the most important contingent ofcoolies,
peons and factory workers associated with the grain market.
The People
It is difficult ta estimate the number of people whose activities are directly
linked to the grain market in Delhi. Such an attempt poses methodological
problems. However, it may be convenientin this essay to offer an approximate
estimation of the numbers ofpeople involved in the different activities which
play a prominent role in the organization of the market as a whole.7
the number of palledan (coolies) can be estimated at 10,000, with just
under a third working in Naya Bazaar and the other two-thirds workip..~
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mostly in Lawrence Road and other godowns disseminated throughout
the city. Most of them are associated with particular traders but a few
work on a freelance basis.
the number of peons can be estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000.
the number of accountants between 3,000 and 4,500.
the number of traders between 3,000 and 5,000.
the number of intermediaries is something which the market people
themselves find most difficult to evaluate. While the official number
seems to stand at around 5,000, not all of them are effectively active in
the market at the same time. Only one or two thousand of them are
based at Naya Bazaar and no more than half of them are constantly
active. The others live outside Delhi and do not necessarily come regularly
to the market.
the number of people associated with the various mOGes of transport
which cater almost exclusively ta the needs of the grain trade may be
estimated at between 5 and 10,000.
the number ofworkers in the faetories processing grain in Delhi is also
difficult to evaluate. It is estimated that there are about 500 grain factories
which employ an average of 10 to 20 people, meaning that their sum
total would consist of sorne 5 to 10,000 workers.
There are, without doubt, many other people whose acti"lties could be
included in this list, but even if one considers only the few categories
mentioned here, the people directly associated with this market could
number anything between thirty and fortY thousand. However, more
interesting than their exact number is the distribution ofcaste, class, gender,
religious and regional identities amongst them.1t is noticeable, for example,
that nearly all traders in the grain market are Hindu, belong to merchant
castes and trace their origins to Haryana or the Punjab (more than 90 per
cent of them, according to those questioned). One does not find such
homogeneity among other groups. For example only 65 per cent of da/als
and only 40 per cent of accountants are thought to belong ta the merchant
castes. The distribution of Brahmins in differentroles in the marketfollows
the opposite trajec tory. Whilst amongst the traders there are almost no
Brahmins, amongst da/ais we find roughly 20 per cent and amongst
accountants 30 per cent Brahmins.
Caste, regional origin and economic power are all significant factors of
identity in the market place but their particular relevance varies in different
professions. For example, although the traders share a similar background
in terms ofregion and caste, it is their access to capital that gives them their
distinctiveness in the market. Among coolies it is regional origin ralher than
caste identity that is emphasized. In each case what really matters are the
networks that one's identity enables one ta tap into both in terms ofbusiness
and social relations. However one cannot fail to notice the almost total
absence of Muslims in the market with the exception ofa few Muslim coolies
mainly from Rajasthan.
The Trade
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Most of the grain which passes through Delhi is neither produced nor
processed nor consumed in Delhi itself. The grain market ofDelhi constitutes
one of many elements in the global network which feeds the grain market of
north India. Before the grain reaches the market in Delhi, most of it has
already gone through the hands of local and regional traders. Moreover, in
the case of rice, it will also have passed through the hands of factory owners
for processing. Similarly, when it leaves Delhi, it will generally be resold to
other regional traders who will go on to sell it to shopkeepers before it finally
reaches the consumer.
Delhi's importance as one of the largest grain markets of Asia cannot
however be understood purely in terms ofeCQnomic logic. A variety offactors,
political and historical as weIl as fiscal and cultural, come into play. Delhi's
relative proximity to the most fertile tracts of the Indo-Gangetic plain and
the importance of a trading community which has kept multiple links with
these regions play an important role; as does the centrality of Delhi in the
railway network oflndia and the existence ofan important consumer market
which guarantees the existence of a minimal demand for agricultural
products. However, the importance of Delhi as the epicentre of grain
transaction also rests on more fragile foundations: according to market
people, one of the main reasons why most of the grain passes through the
capital and is not sent directly from the producer to the consumer area is
fiscal. Similarly, the importance of Delhi as the main place for the export of
rice is primarily due to reasons which are more political and institutional
than strictly economic. Technically, it is due to the fact that Delhi has obtained
the legal and fiscal status of a 'dry port',8 but it is no doubt also influenced
by the fact that Delhi, as the capital, is also the place where political decisions
are taken and policies made.
Not only are the reasons for the centrality of Delhi in the network of
grain markets in north India many, but the general organization of the grain
trade itself is also rather intricate. Basically, the market for grains and pulses
in no'rth India is divided into two. This is because the Indian government
enforces an agricultural policy whereby a large proportion of each year's
production ofgrain is sold to the state at prices fixed by the administration.
Government institutions also have the responsibility for storing and
distributing this part of the produce; or eventually selling it on the free market
in order to regulate the price of agricultural goods. Such a policy is
increasingly being contested nowadays, partly because of the general trend
toward liberalization and partly due to accusations of inefficiency and em-
bezzlement against the government. Nevertheless, one should not forget
that it was the direct involvement of the Indian state in the grain market that
helped India attain its nutritional autonomy from the 1960s; and also that in
spite ofits relative inefficiency, the procurement system plays a role in fighting
speculation, price variations and hoarding practices in the grain market.9
Finally, there is no guarantee that the fullliberalization of the grain market
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would, in any sense, be more profitable for the ordinary people of India.
But whatever the case may be, it is the remaining part of each year's
production which is traded on a free-market basis in Naya Bazaar and in the
other grain markets of north India.
The importance of this free-market should not, however, be under-
estimated, not only because it is one of the market places where representa-
tives of the state intervene, often massively, in their attempt to stabilize the
priee and the supply of food grain in India, but also because the physical
trade and turnover of a market like Naya Bazaar is far greater than what
official records and statistics imply.1O This is particularly the case because
Naya Bazaar remains one of the most important markets for agricultural
products which has succeeded in avoiding becoming officially a 'regulated'
market. Il The market people of Delhi are among the very few trading
communities to have managed successfully to retain the entire and exclusive
control of a market of such importance. This is also what makes it such an
interesting place for studying the role of intermediaries.
THE INVENTION OF THE MARKET SCENE
The Making 0/Marketable Goods
One of the most common activities tlIat can be seen in Naya Bazaar is the
making up of grain samples. This is done by using an instrument known as
a parkhi, which looks somewhat like a dagger with a small gutter down the
centre. The instrument is inserted into the side ofa bag of grain in such a
way that when it is withdrawn it brings with it a few grains for inspection.
According to the number of bags which have to be checked, the trader or
his assistant will systematically take tiny samples of grains from each bag or
from an arbitrary selection of them. Nowadays, the samples are generally
kept in small plastic bags withjust a few indications written on them regarding
the provenance and the quantity of the grain. But in Naya Bazaar it is still
possible to see intermediaries using the old technique oftransporting samples
in carefully knotted folds of clotho
It might appear to sorne that the technique of creating samples
constitutes only a small ethnographie detail which does not have much to
do either with the general organization of the market or with the principles
of market economy. But as 1 have briefly hinted before, this is not the case:
in more than one sense this very simple technique ofsampling could be said
to define the specifie space of the market more than anything else.
There are various points at stake here. The first obvious point is that
grain is both voluminous and heavy in proportion to its cost and it is there-
fore difficult to survey precisely what each bag con tains. Traders and
intermediaries have to deal everyday with transactions which represent
hundreds of tons ofgoods. This is obviously difficult to do. There are basically
two ways of transmitting information: either 'analogically' by transmit-
ting sorne of the physical qualities of the' data through a channel of
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communication; or 'digitally' by coding all the relevant information. The
choiee of method employed in trading is no different. The use of samples
can be considered as an 'analogical' technique while the use ofa 'gradation'
system in order to communicate the quality of the grain can be identified a
'digital' one.
In India there have been numerous attempts to introduce a system of
gradation which could conveniently be used by all market people to assess
more simply and more quickly the quality of grain all over the country.12
Such a system of grading has effectively been put into use in the case of
certain agricultural products but it has not been generalized until now in
the case of Naya Bazaar. Market people are on the whole opposed to the
idea. According to them there are just too many types of grain of too many
different qualities for such a system to be functional; it would either be too
imprecise or too complicated. Only the biggest traders and exporters seem
to be in favour of such a system. But they are also keen that the grain
production of the entire country be radically homogenized because of the
specific requirement of their politic of commercialization.
The quick succession of small gestures which allow traders and com-
mercial intermediaries to assess the quality of a grain sample have a quasi-
ritual quality and it is obvious to any observer that it is at such moments that
market people employ aIl their commercial acumen. It is on the basis of this
that they will make their own estimation of the price they are ready to pa)'
for the grain. They will also have to judge the quality of grain and ca1culate
what the potential çlemand for it might be, according to its price and the
evolution of the market.
Another noticeable point in the way market people use such samples is
their apparent absenee of doubt about whether the grain they eventually
receive will correspond to the sample. One might think this irrelevant because
traders generally pay for the totality of the grain they buy only after they
have had the chance to check its quantity and quality. But it must also be
recognized that at the time that they check it, any calling into question of
the deal would certainly be contested and would become a matter ofirritation
and loss of time if not a direct loss of money for all the operators involved.
Neither should one conclude that the possibility that a load of grain does
not correspond to what is expected is so uncommon in this trade. Two
examples serve to Ulustrate the point.
The first coneerns the difficulties encountered by Indian exporters on
the in ternational market after the exceptional year of 1995-6. It so happened
that in this year India was practically the only big rice-growing country to
have had a good level of production while the production among nearly all
the other main rice suppliers of the world was low. As a result India had the
opportunity to export more than it had ever done before on the international
market.'~And because huge quantities had been kept in reserve in state
granaries, which proved unnecessary because of the abundance of the crop.
the government institutions in charge of these reserves were allowed to sell
huge quantities of rice to exporters at the market priee. At the time no one
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bothered much about the quality of the rice. This was the rice which was
usually sold in. government shops to people who are not in a position to
protest. 14 But foreign importers we're inevitably more fastidious. As a
consequence, well-established exporters complained the following year that
speculators had, within a single year, succeeded in lowering India's reputation
on the international rice market. 15
The second example takes us ta the other end of the economic and
geographic spectrum. Just adjacent to one side of Naya Bazaar is an un-
authorized market, populated almost exclusively by immigrant Biharis. Here
grain is sold to Delhites ofmodest income at heavily discounted plices. These
shops are filled with grain, which has been sold by the traders ofNaya Bazaar
at a cheap rate, usually because, for sorne reason, it did not fit their
expectations when they checked its quality. One of the petty traders of this
market explained the principle of a trick which consisted of asking
accomplices to add discreetly a little dirt to one or two bags of rice of good
qua!ity so that when a trader in Naya Bazaar takes his sample he is likely to
reject the bags and to end up selling them very cheaply to marginal traders.
Such examples are obviously extreme; taken too far they would imply a
radical contrast between how tra,ders behave when they deal with insiders or
with outsiders: while according to one example they do not hesitate to
discount a bag of best quality rice if it contains a !iule dirt, according to the
other example, they are apparently less scrupulous in dealing with public
organizations or with the foreign market. Such an interpretation would surely
be exaggerated. Nevertheless, knowing the difficulties linked with the
assessment of the quality of the merchandise in this trade, one should not
underestimate the achievement of a market organization which allows a few
thousand people to make transactions which may amount to thousands of
bags of 100 kg everyday, on the basis of a few handfuls of grain circulating
from hand to hand. This is possible precisely because market transactions
combine two sorts of interpersonal relationship. On the one hand, buyers
and sellers remain largely anonyrnous to each other ; on the other hand, at
every stage of the market process, transactions are made exclusively by
persons who know each other personally. These two relationships no longer
seem contradictory once we begin to recognize the l'ole of the intermediary
in the functioning of the market.1t is because all transactions are mediated
by them that buyers and sellers don't have to know each other; but it is also
because of their presence and of their intimate knowledge of all market
actors that ail transactions are done between persons who know each other.
The Personification of the Market Actors
Naya Bazaar is certainly one of the most crowded areas of Delhi. But unlike
many other parts of the old city this crowding is not due to the influx of
clients and passers-by. As a matter of fact, one could spend days observing
the activity of the market and the unfolding of transactions, without ever
meeting any of the people who have either supplied or bought the grain
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sold in the market. If by any chance one of them happens to come to the
market it is usually not to negotiate or conclude a deal but rather to socialize
with traders, to check the pulse of market activity, to resolve a problem or to
settle a dispute. Basically, the only people there who are not based in Delhi
are commercial intermediaries who have come on behalf of factory owners
or regional traders in order to sell some grain to the Delhi traders. As a
consequence, one of the main characteristics of this market is the way in
whieh it functions almost exclusively on the basis of transactions between
the market people of Naya Bazaar themselves. One proof is the fact that if
one were coming to the market in order to buy or to sell anything without
being represented or, at least, very strongly introduced and recommended
by some insider, not only would that person risk being neglected but he
would also find that the only possible transaction open to him would be the
direct exchange of cash against merchandise. In other words, he would not
be allowed to benefit from the full potentialities of the market.
The attraction of Delhi as one of the most important market places for
the grain trade is, as already pointed out, due to a variety offactors. Among
them one reason which seems to have played a particularly important role is
the major way in which the traders of Delhi have always assumed not only
the role of trader but also that of an adati (commission agent). Basically, the
traders of Naya Bazaar have been able to attract a large supply of grain
(especially after the harvest when the priees are low) by offering to pay their
clients in advance approximately 70 or 80 per cent of the sum they will get
later on when their grain will be sold in the market place. Once this is done,
they will give the grain seller the remaining part of the priee, and only then
claim their own commission.
What is remarkable about such a procedure is that large reserves of
grain immediately disposable for sale are continuously stocked in the capital.
And because Delhi traders generally offer credit to the buyers of the grain,
Naya Bazaar benefits from the reputation of being the place where, at any
given point of time, supplies are abundant and transactions swift and not
too hampered by heavy administrative control. On the one hand, suppliers
have some sort of guarantee that they can get almost immediately a large
percentage of the priee they want for their grain, without having to face the
alternative ofwaiting for a customer or to sell their grain too cheaply; on the
other hand, buyers will also be reasonably sure that at any given time they
will be able to find the quantity and the quality of grain they need.
As already noted, one of the basic assumptions of the economic literature
about markets is that the confrontation between buyers and sellers is the
focal point in any market transaction. It is of course recognized that such a
confrontation is often mediated by ail sorts of intermediaries. But the latter
are generally perceived to he standing in for the real partners of the exchange.
If they involve themselves in a deal, they are quickly suspected of distorting
the functioning of the market process. But in the case of a market like Naya
Bazaar, it is practically the opposite whieh is true. Not only do the buyers
and sellers seldom meet each other; but the distinction between a trader
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who buys a load of grain in order to sell it later to one of his customers and
the one who does it from the beginning on behalf of one of his customers is
almost imperceptible. More fundamentally, the practice of traders who are
being paid only on a commission basis but who nevertheless advance most
of the price of the grain to the seller before the transaction takes place,
blurs practically any distinction between the main partners of a transaction
(the 'real' buyers and the 'real' sellers) and the intermediaries. It does not
make sense to consider a trader who has paid in advance 80 per cen t of a
load of grain which is stocked in a godown belonging to him and who has
the charge of selling it on behalf of his client as a simple intermediary.
Similarly, if he buys sorne grain with his own money for a client who has
given precise indications of the quality and quantity ofgrain he wants, and if
he takes only a fixed commission on the price, will he be considered as a
trader or as a commission agent? Such distinctions seem somewhat immaterial
at the time of the transaction.
Let us now summarize: ln the streets of Naya Bazaar, not only are huge
loads ofgrain replaced by tiny samples ofgrain but, as we have just seen, the
people who sell the grain to Delhi and those who buy it from Delhi are
'replaced' by the market people who more or less assume their roles during
the transaction. But this is not ail. There is yet another aspect to the
'immateriality' of the functioning of this market that 1 wish to stress. One
normally will not see, either at Naya Bazaar or elsewhere in Delhi, traders
negotiating directly the exact terms of a transaction. If necessary, there is
the possibility of contacting each other by telephone, fax or letter. But un til
now these remain only auxiliary channels of communication. Normally aIl
transactions which take place between market aetors are mediated by
specialized intermediaries who interpose themselves not only on behalf of
outsiders who cannot be present in Delhi but also on behalfofinsiders within
the market itself. Almost all transactions take place through intermediaries. 16
As one trader explained to me: even if he had to negotiate a deal with his
immediate neighbours, he would always prefer to do it through an
in termediary.
The Making of Transactions
Every morning, dozens of intermediaries will visit each trader in Naya Bazaar
to enquire if they have sorne load of grain to be sold. Mter assessing the
quality of the samples, they will enter into discussion with the traders to sort
out what can be reasonably expected from a given load of grain. Having
made their first round of the traders, they will have a certain amount of
grain sampies and will renew contact with certain traders, either by
telephoning them or by meeting them directly. This time their aim will be
not only to assess the offer of the day but also to find in the market a demand
which corresponds to il. Though one should not take such estimations too
seriously, 1have tried to calculate the number ofpersonal interactions which
take place bctween traders and intermediaries in the market every working
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day: according to this estimate, there should be no less than 30,000 of them
(and probably much more). Once market intermediaries have found a
potential demand for an offer of grain on the market, they will be used as
go-betweens throughout the duration of the transaction, which will normally
last anything from one to three days. It is generally only after the conditions
of a deal have been agreed to that the partners of the transaction will enter
into a brief contact, usually by telephone, in order ta confirm their agree-
ment. But if they trust the intermediaries and know with whom they are
dealing, they often will not bother making even this brief contact.
Moreover, the intermediaries function more than simply as go-betweens.
Even if they are not financially or legally responsible, their reputations are
at stake when they organize or supervise a deal. When they buy grain, traders
consider it equally the responsibility of the intermediaries in whom they put
their trust to make sure that the quality of the grain effectively corresponds
to what they have been shown in the sample. And when they go on to sell it,
they expect a certain guarantee that the buyers will effectively repay their
credit.
Finally, in a market like Naya Bazaar, the conditions of a transaction
obviously have to be agreed to by aIl the partners involved. Generally, there
is no written contract to confirm the tenns of agreement. Thus, one of the
most important functions of market intermediaries is to stand as witnesses
to any agreements that are made under their supervision.
THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET
What makes the importance of a market place like Naya Bazaar, and what
distinguishes it fundamentally from a simple collection of individual firms,
is the fact that most transactions involve at least four main protagonists:
besides the ones who supply the grain to Delhi and those who buy it from
Delhi, there are generally two local traders who play an intermediary role in
the transaction (acting either as traders strieto sensu or as commission agents).
Moreover, as 1have already pointed out, dalals are also used as intermediaries
to establish and main tain the contact between each of these 'main actors'.
The fact that there are two traders rather than one involved directly in
most market transactions may seem yet again an insignificant detail. However,
it is precisely this fact which changes the nature of the majority of transactions
in the market: as long as a trader sells only what he has already bought or
buys only what he will be able to sell to his own clients, the extent of his
operations will necessarily be limited; but if traders do not hesitate-as
appears to be the case-to sell to their own customers whatever grain is
available on the market, and if they do not hesitate either to buy grain in
order to sell it themselves or on behalfoftheir clients to other market people,
then each of them is able to give their clients access to aIl the demands and/
or supplies available in the market. Or, rather they are able to do it insofar as
they are able to diffuse market information and to facilitate transactions
which may involve and mobilize quickly a vast number of local traders.
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What characterizes such a market, then, is the fact that it blurs the
distinction which is usually made between bazaars and markets, and more
generally between 'real' markets and supposedly less 'rational' institutions.
Basically, in this system people only effectuate transactions with those they
know. Vet, at the same time, they get access through these intermediaries to
all the other resources available in the market place.
The Inevitability ofInterrnediaries
Intermediaries are generally ill considered in any sort of deal. It is not
surprising to find that the connotations associated with the term dalal in
India are none too flatte ring. The mediation of a dalal in any transaction
rapidly evokes the image of a world of opacity, of dubious patronage and
shady negotiations, if not more radically, of illegality, blackmail, and
corruption. Many people in the Indian capital feel that the role of dalals in
most domains of the social and economic life of Delhi should be deplored
or perceived as sorne sort of social pathology. Nonetheless it is worth noting
that two different criticisms are often blended in such condemnation in
spite of being based on very different sets of implicit assumptions: On the
one hand, the intervention of dalalsin diverse social transactions is commonly
considered ablatant symptom of the extent to which commercialization and
financial greed have pervaded the sociallife of the whole city. In this sense
they are perceived as the very personification of the logic of the market. But
on the other hand, they are often also perceived to represent the proof that
a particular society or a specific economic sector has not yet attained the
status of a mature market. Viewed in this perspective market intermediaries
are criticized for introducing a strong element of opacity into economic
transactions.
"''bat 1have attempted to show in this essay is that the distinction between
a market like Naya Bazaar and a simple collection of individual traders lies
mainly in the existence ofintermediaries who mediate between the partners
of commercial transactions. It would be erroneous to assume that with the
generalization ofmarket culture, intermediaries such as those found in Naya
Bazaar will disappear. ln fact, the idea that markets could exist without
intermediaries is really little more than an intellectual illusion or ideological
mystification. The condemnation of dalals is little more than the con-
demnation of market institution itself. But of course, intermediaries can
always change their tune. Perhaps the dalals of the future will all have degrees
in marketing and advertising.
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my questions. And 1 would like to thank also Rajender Singh Negi whose personal assistance
has been invaluable for the ethnographic study ofthis market in 1997.
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8. The expression 'dry port' basically means that ail customs operations and formalities
concerning the exportation and importation of goods can be done within Delhi itself as if
it were a border. The goods, therefore, remain in sealed containers on the Indian territory
before eventually being shipped abroad.
9. In contrast with the very small body of literature dedicated to the empirical functioning
ofwholesale markets like the one which is studied here (for an exception see the works of
Barbara Harriss-White (in particular: B. Harriss-White, A Politieal Economy ofAgricultural
Marluits in South India, Delhi: Sage, 1996), there is an abundance on the appraisal of the
procurement palicy by the Indian State. Cf. S.S. Acharya and N.L. Agarwal, Agricultural
Marluiting in India, Delhi: OUP, 1987, pp. 216-302.
la. 'In 1994-1995, as much as 60 per cent of the food subsidy in 1994-1995 went to finance the
buffer stock, sales on the open market, or export (World Bank 1996)'. P. Balakrishnan
and B. Ramaswami, Economie and Politieal Weekly, 25-31 January 1997, p. 165.
1I. For an excellent study of the impact of regulation on agricultural markets in India, cf. B.
Harriss-White 'Order, Order ... Agro-<:ommercial Micro-Structures and the State: The
Experience of Regulation' in B. Stein and S. Subrahmanyam, op. cit., 1996.
12. Ibid., pp. 81-93.
13. In 1995-6, India, which only began to export rice in the late seventies, emerged as the
second largest world exporter with about 5 millions of tons.
14. Cf. P. Balakrishnan and B. Ramaswami, 'Quality of Public Distribution System. Why it
matters', Economie and Politieal Weekly, 25-31 January 1997, p. 162.
15. One could even find a mild echo of this polemic in the very offical magazine of the AIl
India Rice Exports Association: 'Today, though we have managed to make our presence
felt in the graph of global rice trade, yet till now we are not able to create a goodwill which
USA or Thailand enjoys. However, few Indian rice shipments made last year byopportunist
exporters and importers did invite sorne criticism on the quality front', Rice India,January
1997, p. 21.
16. '1 never go to meet my parties. l've "seen" Sethji also only on phone. It is for the first time
that 1am seeing him face to face. It's the mutual trust that makes ail the difference in this
trade. And 1 too have come here for the reasons of restoring that trust.' Excerpt of an
interview during an arbitration meeting at the Delhi Grain Merchant Association, 14April
1997.
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